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I. INTRODUCTION
The curtain shielding a parent corporation from the acts of its subsidiary
under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act of 1980' ("CERCLA') is more like a shroud of mystery.
Recently, the United States Supreme Court left undisturbed much of the
choice of law confusion surrounding CERCLA veil-piercing analyses. While
some courts and commentators have argued that this debate is essentially
meaningless because state and federal veil piercing tests are purportedly
consistent, this issue has generated a tremendous amount of litigation and is
actually much more important than naysayers admit.
Shareholders generally are liable for corporate debts only to the extent of
their investment capital in the corporation.' In certain circumstances, how-
ever, courts will disregard the corporate entity and hold shareholders person-
ally liable for corporate obligations This is known as the doctrine of "pierc-
ing the corporate veil."4 Circumstances warranting disregard of the corporate
* B.S., 1996, Pennsylvania State University; J.D. 1999, University of Pittsburgh School of Law.
Law Review Topics Editor. I wish to thank David J. Herring, Professor of Law and Dean of the University
of Pittsburgh School of Law, for his editorial advice on this paper. I also thank Robert Garland, Chief
Financial Officer of AFR Holdco, Inc., for his advice regarding this paper.
1 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607 (1998).
2 See W. FlErcmER & C. VAN SWEARINGEN, FLECH CYCOPEDA CORPORATIONS § 14 (1983
rev. ed.).
3 See Robert B. Thompson, Piercing the Corporate Veil. An Empirical Study, 76 CORNELL L
REV. 1036, 1041 (1991).
4 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1147 (6th Ed. 1990).
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entity vary widely and usually turn on questions of fact.' While federal com-
mon law and all of the states have corporate veil-piercing tests which share
some core principles, the similarities of these tests have been overstated.6
State common law and federal common law veil piercing analyses are
currently used7 under CERCLA to determine individual shareholder liability
for the actions of the corporation as well as parent corporation liability for the
actions of a subsidiary This article focuses on the relationship between
parent corporations and their subsidiaries and attempts to explain why
variation among veil-piercing tests presents an obstacle to the successful
implementation of CERCLA and federal policies behind CERCLA.
Section 11 provides an overview of CERCLA liability. Section MII explains
United States v. Bestfoods,9 the most recent decision by the United States
Supreme Court regarding parent corporation liability under CERCLA. The
remainder of the article presents the existing confusing state of affairs and
argues for a federal common law standard to be developed by the United
States Supreme Court that will finally draw the curtain on this specter of
litigious debate.
H. LiABILTY UNDER CERCLA
CERCLA is a remedial federal statute designed to foster the cleanup of
past pollution problems."0 "While there are elements of CERCLA that
influence on-going conduct, and while the specter of future liability for
current carelessness may have a deterrent effect on wrongful conduct, the
premise of CERCLA was and remains remedial.""
CERCLA identifies four categories of "covered persons" who may be
called upon to pay for CERCLA clean up." Such persons are:
(1) the owner and operator of a vessel or facility,
See Ronald G. Aronovsky & Lynn D. Fuller, Liability of Parent Corporations for Hazardous
Substance Releases Under CERCLA, 24 U.S.F.LREv. 421,431 (1990).
6 See infra Section V.
See infra Section IV.
a See Aronovsky & Fuller, supra note 5, at 439.
9 118 S.Ct. 1876 (1998).
10 See Kanie Frischknecht Brown, Parent Corporation Liability for Subsidiary Violations Under
§107 of CERCLA: Responding to United States v. Cordova Chemical Co., BYU L REV. 265, 268 (1998);
Lucia Ann Silecchia, Pinning the Blame & Piercing the Veil in the Mists of Metaphor: The Supreme
Court's New Standards for the CERCLA Liability of Parent Companies and A Proposal for Legislative
Reform, 67 FORDHAM L REV. 115, 116 (1998).
1 Silecchia, supra note 10, at 124.
1 See 42 U.S.C.A. §9607.
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(2) any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous sub-
stance owned or operated any facility at which such hazardous
substances were disposed of,
(3) any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged for
disposal or treatment, or arranged with a transporter for transport for
disposal or treatment, of hazardous substances... and
(4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous substances for
transport ...13
While CERCLA defines "person" to include "an individual, firm,
corporation, association, partnership, consortium, joint venture, commercial
activity, United States Government, municipality, commission, political
subdivision of a state, or any interstate body," there is nothing in the language
of the act that specifically refers to the liability of a parent company for the
acts of its subsidiary. 4
Thus, a major problem with the statute is that it has proven very difficult
to determine who is a corporate polluter responsible for cleanup costs.
Section 107(a) of the statute imposes potential liability on current or past
"owners" or "operators" of facilities where there is a release or a threatened
release of a hazardous substance. The precise definition of "owner" and
"operator" has generated a tremendous quantity of litigation,"s much of which
is consumed often by choice of law debates rather than substantive discussions
of responsibility.
In today's world of complex corporate structure, pinning liability on a
corporation under CERCLA can be very complex. When a subsidiary
corporation controls a problematic facility, there is no debate that the
subsidiary is an "operator" of the facility under CERCLA. However, when a
parent corporation of a subsidiary is sued, the problem becomes more
complex. The United States Supreme Court took up this issue in late
December of 1997, granting certiorari to a Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
decision. 6 The resulting United States v. Bestfoods, "' issued in June of 1998,
settled some questions and left others unanswered. Bestfoods is significant
because it is "the Court's first substantive ruling in nearly twenty years on the
question of CERCLA liability."'8
13 Id.
14 See Silecchia, supra note 10, at 126; Frischknecht Brown, supra note 10, at 270.
1s See Silecchia, supra note 10, at 117.
16 See United States v. Bestfoods, 118 S.Ct. 1876, 1884 (1998).
1 118 S.Ct. 1876.
9 Lisa K. Seilheimer, October 1997 Term: United States v. Bestfoods, 5 ENVTL. L 303 (1998).
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Il. UNITED STATES V. BESTFOODS
In Besifoods, the United States commenced an action against Ott Chemical
Company, the owner of a chemical plant, for the costs of cleaning up
industrial waste intentionally and unintentionally generated by the plant. 9
Also named as defendants were CPC International Inc. ("CPC"), which had
incorporated a wholly-owned subsidiary ("Ott II') to purchase Ott Chemical
Company's assets, and Aerojet-General Corporation ("Aerojet"), the parent
of a wholly-owned subsidiary which had purchased the plant once operated
by Ott H1.20
The District Court for the Western District of Michigan held that a parent
corporation can be held liable as an operator when it operates the facility
directly, and, indirectly, when the corporate veil can be pierced.2 The District
Court asserted that a parent which exercises control and participation over a
subsidiary's functions and decision-making creates direct operator liability
whereas a parent which merely exercises oversight of its subsidiary's business
does not.22 Under this framework, the District Court held CPC and Aerojet
directly liable as operators of the chemical facility.
23
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed the District Court's
decision, holding "that where a parent corporation is sought to be held liable
as an operator pursuant to [CERCLA] based upon the extent of its control of
its subsidiary which owns the facility, the parent will only be liable when the
requirements necessary to pierce the corporate veil are met." 2' Applying
Michigan veil-piercing law, the Court of Appeals held that neither CPC nor
Aerojet was liable for the actions of its subsidiaries.25 Under Michigan law,
piercing the corporate veil requires "a unity of interest and ownership [such]
that the separate personalities of the corporation and its owner cease to exist"
and "circumstances... such that adherence to the fiction of separate corporate
9 See Bestfoods, 118 S.Ct. at 1881. Cleanup costs were expected to run into the tens of millions
of dollars. See id. at 1882. "[Ihe land [around the chemical facility was] littered with thousands of
leaking and even exploding drums of waste, and the soil and water [was] saturated with noxious chemicals."
Id. The groundwater "contained foam and a brownish color like root beer." CPC Int'l, Inc. v. Aerojet-
General Corp., 777 F. Supp. 549, 562-63 (W.D. Mich. 1991), rev'd, 59 F.3d 584 (6th Cir. 1995), rev'd,
118 S.Ct. 1876 (1998).
20 See Bestfoods, 118 S.Ct. at 1882.




25 See id. at 1884.
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existence would sanction a fraud or promote injustice."26 The Court of
Appeals held that CPC and Aerojet's ownership and control of the subsidiar-
ies did not indicate that the corporate form was utilized to perpetrate a "fraud
or wrong".27
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated the Court of
Appeal's decision, and remanded the case for a decision consistent with its
opinion.2' The Court held that a parent corporation can be liable for its
subsidiary's actions both directly and indirectly. 29 The parent can be held
directly liable if it acts as an operator of the facility in question.30 The Court
defined an "operator" as an entity which "directs the working of, manages, or
conducts the affairs of a facility.., specifically related to the pollution."'" The
direct operation test used by the Court differed from that used by the District
Court because the Court focused on the relationship between the parent and
the facility rather than the parent and the subsidiary. The Court stated, "[t]he
question is not whether the parent operates the subsidiary, but rather whether
it operates the facility, and that operation is evidenced by participation in the
activities of the facility, not the subsidiary. 33
The Court held that the District Court erred by premising liability on the
parent corporations' ownership and control of the board of directors of the
subsidiaries.34 Such normal corporate oversight of a subsidiary can be
distinguished from actual control by an officer over the subsidiary's facility. 5
[A]ctivities that involve the facility but which are consistent with the
parent's investor status, such as monitoring of the subsidiary's
performance, supervision of the subsidiary's finance and capital
budget decisions, and articulation of general policies and procedures,
should not give rise to direct liability. The critical question is
whether, in degree and detail, actions directed to the facility by an
26 United States v. Cordova Chem. Co. of /fich., 59 F.3d 584, 591 (6th Cir. 1995), rev'd 118 S.Ct.
1876 (1998).
27 See id. at 591-92.
'n See Bestfoods, 118 S.Ct. at 1884.
29 See id. at 1886.
30 See id.
31 Id. at 1887.
32 See id.
33 Id. (quoting Oswald, Bifurcation of the Owner and Operator Analysis under CERCLA, 72
WASH. U.L.Q. 223, 269 (1994)).
34 See id. at 1888.
35 See id. at 1889.
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agent of the parent alone are eccentric under accepted norms of
parental oversight of a subsidiary's facility.36
The Court declined to settle an issue of significant disagreement, namely
whether state law or federal common law should apply in indirect veil piercing
analyses, because neither party raised the issue in lower court proceedings.37
The Court set the stage, however, for addressing this issue in the future. The
Court spelled out two competing principles of law. First, it is a deeply
ingrained principle in our economic and legal systems that a parent corpora-
tion will not be held liable for the actions of its subsidiary.3" However, an
equally fundamental principle of law holds that the parent-subsidiary veil may
be pierced and the parent corporation shareholder held liable when the
corporate form is used to accomplish wrongful purposes.39  Nothing in
CERCLA addresses the issue of when and under what principle a corporate
veil should be pierced.' CERCLA gives no indication whether "the entire
corpus of state corporation law should be replaced simply because a plaintiff's
cause of action is based upon a federal statute.""' "In order to abrogate a
common-law principle, the statute must speak directly to the question
addressed by common law."'42
The Bestfoods Court left untouched the Sixth Circuit's application of state
law principles to its piercing analysis,43 but in no way endorsed the Sixth
Circuit's approach as correct. In fact, in a footnote of the opinion, the Court
noted that a dispute exists whether state or federal law should apply." The
Court did not address a second issue: if state law applies, which states laws
should apply?
IV. INDIRECT LIABILITY: VEIL PIERCING
Veil piercing analyses under CERCLA are subjects of great disagreement
and confusion. Such analyses present not only a question of whether state or
federal common law should apply, but also of which state law should apply.
There are four possibilities courts could utilize: (i) federal common law; (ii)
36 Id.
3 See id. at 1886 n. 9.
39 See id. at 1884.
39 See id. at 1885.
40 See id.
41 l (quoting Burks v. Lakser, 441 U.S. 471,478 (1979)).
42 Id. (quoting United States v. Texas, 507 U.S. 529, 534 (1993)).
43 See Frischknecht Brown, supra note 10, at 277.
4 See Besfoods, 118 S.Ct. at 1886 n.9.
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the veil piercing formula of the state wherein a parent is incorporated; (iii) the
forum state; or (iv) the state where the activity took place. While some courts
have argued that it makes little difference which test is used,4  the choice is,
in fact, significant. State veil-piercing analyses often differ from one another"
and the parties contemplating a lawsuit may be uncertain as to which law
applies.
The various federal circuits take different approaches to the issue of which
state's laws apply in veil piercing analyses and more than one circuit has held
that federal common law, rather than state law, is the appropriate source of
guidance. Left to the circuits, this issue has become confused. This section
demonstrates the variation among circuits by examining the choice of law
approaches of several of the circuits which have dealt with it directly or
indirectly.47
In the First Circuit, courts have held that the decision whether to disregard
corporate separateness in CERCLA contexts is governed by federal common
law.48 The Second Circuit also looks to federal common law.49 According to
both the First and Second Circuits, the following factors are relevant in
descending order of importance:
(1) inadequate capitalization in light of purposes for which the
corporation was organized [;] (2) extensive or pervasive control by
the shareholder or shareholders [;] (3) intermingling of the corpora-
tion's properties or accounts with those of its owner [;] (4) failure to
observe corporate formalities and separateness [;] (5) siphoning of
funds from the corporation [;] (6) absence of corporate records [;] and
(7) nonfunctioning officers or directors.
50
Similar to the First and the Second Circuits, the Third Circuit has held that
federal common law, rather than state law, governs corporate veil piercing
4 See, e.g., Acushnet River & New Bedford Harbor Proceedings, 675 F. Supp. 22, 33 (D.Mass.
1987) ("The choice between state and federal [veil-piercing law] may in many cases present questions of
academic interest, but little practical significance.")
46 See infra Section V.
47 As of January 1999, on the issue of choice of law under CERCLA, research indicates that not
all of the circuits have spoken. For the purpose of this discussion, those several circuits which have spoken
on this issue directly or indirectly will be considered.
a' See United States v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 724 F. Supp. 15, 19, 20 (D.R.L 1989); Acushnet River,
675 F. Supp. at 31.
49 See Town of Oyster Bay v. Occidental Chem. Corp., 987 F. Supp. 182. 202 (E.D.N.Y. 1997);
see also City of New York v. Exxon Corp., 112 B.R. 540, 552-553 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), affd in part, 932 F.2d
1020 (2d. Cir. 1991).
50 Town of Oyster Bay, 987 F. Supp. at 203; Acushnet River, 675 F. Supp. at 33.
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under CERCLA.5" Important factors include whether corporate formalities
were adhered to, whether the two corporations entered into business trans-
actions at arm's length, and whether the subsidiary was undercapitalized.52
The Fifth Circuit applies state law to CERCLA veil-piercing analyses.53
While the Fifth Circuit has not directly spoken on the issue of choice of law,'
it applies the law of the state of incorporation when a corporation's internal
affairs are implicated and applies the law of the state with the most significant
relationship when non-internal affairs are implicated.5" Internal affairs are
"matters peculiar to the relationships among or between the corporation and
its current officers, directors, and shareholders[.]" '56 In non-internal matters,
the choice of law principles stated in The Restatement (Second) of Conflicts
§301 are relevant in identifying the state with the most significant relation-
ship.57 The Restatement proposes that:
When there is no [statutory] directive, the factors relevant to the
choice of the applicable rule of law include
(a) the needs of the interstate and international systems,
(b) the relevant policies of the forum,
(c) the relevant policies of other interested states and the relative
interest of those states in the determination of the particular issue,
(d) the protection of justified expectations,
(e) the basic policies underlying the particular field of law,
(f) certainty, predictability and uniformity of result, and
(g) ease in the determination and application of the law to be
applied.5
The Sixth Circuit also applies state corporate law to CERCLA veil-
piercing analyses.59 The Sixth Circuit applies a significant relationship test
51 See Lansford-Coaldale Joint Water Auth. v. Tonolli Corp., 4 F.3d 1209, 1225 (3rd Cir. 1993).
52 See id.
51 See Joslyn Corp. v. T.L James & Co., Inc., 696 F. Supp. 222, 226 (W.D. La. 1988); see also
United States v. Jon-T Chemicals, Inc., 768 F.2d 686, 690 n.6 (5th Cir. 1985). cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1014
(1986).
54 See Jon-T Chemicals, 768 F.2d at 690 n.2 ("[W]e find no need to determine whether a uniform
federal alter ego rule is required, since the federal and state alter ego tests are essentially the same.").
55 See Askanase v. Fatjo, 130 F.3d 657, 670 (5th Cir. 1997); Maher v. Zapata Corp., 714 F.2d
436, 464 (5th Cir. 1983).
5 Askanase, 130 F.3d at 670 (quoting Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 645 (1982).
57 See Askanase, 130 F.3d at 671.
S8 REsrATEMEN (SECOND) oF coNaucrs §301.
59 See Chrysler Corp. v. Ford Motor Co., 972 F. Supp. 1097, 1101 (E.D. Mich. 1997); see also
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similar to the Fifth Circuit, but spells out the test somewhat differently. In
Chrysler Corp. v. Ford Motor Company, " the United States District Court for
the Northern District of Ohio examined this issue as one of first impression
and held that "[iun matters of internal corporate governance, the law of the
state of incorporation will ordinarily govern; while in matters external to the
corporation, more general choice of law rules apply."6' In matters not of
internal governance, the state with the most significant interests will be the
state whose law governs.62 In tort cases, the following factors are important:
"(a) the place of injury; (b) the place of conduct causing the injury; (c) the
domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of business
between the parties; and (d) the place where the relationship between the
parties is centered."'63 In contract situations, such as actions where there is an
absence of effective choice of law provisions, the following factors are
important: "(a) the place of contracting; (b) the place of negotiation of the
contract; (c) the place of performance; (d) the location of the subject matter
of the contract; and (e) the domicile, residence, nationality, place of
incorporation and place of business of the parties."'  Note that under this
approach, the state of incorporation is the determining factor in matters of
internal governance, and it is a factor considered in external matters.
Courts in the Seventh Circuit have held that efforts to pierce the corporate
veil under CERCLA are governed by the law of the state of incorporation."
V. ARE STATE VEIL PIERCING LAWS THE SAME?
In Chrysler, the District Court Judge stated, "the choice between [the two
states' laws] is not material so far as piercing the corporate veil is concerned,
since the legal standards in the two states are substantially similar."" The
Chrysler court articulated a common misconception among commentators and
courts, namely that all state laws regarding piercing the veil are essentially
similar. For example, consider the neighboring states of Pennsylvania and
Ohio. In Pennsylvania, the following factors are considered when determining
whether to disregard the corporate form: undercapitalization; failure to adhere
Anspec Co., Inc. v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 922 F.2d 1240, 1246, 1248 (6th Cir. 1991); AT&T Global
Information Solutions Co. v. Union Tank Car Co., 29 F. Supp. 2d 857, 865 (S.D. Ohio 1998).
60 972 F. Supp. 1097 (1997).
61 Chrysler, 972 F. Supp. at 1102.
62 See id. at 1103.
63 Id. at 1104.
64 Id.
5 See Stromberg Metal Works, Inc. v. Press Mechanical, Inc. 77 F.3d 928, 933 (7th Cir. 1996);
Browning-Ferris Industries of III., Inc. v. Ter Maat, 13 F. Supp. 2d 756, 765 (N.D. 11. 1998).
66 Chrysler, 972 F. Supp. at 1104.
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to corporate formalities; substantial intermingling of corporate and personal
affairs; and the use of the corporate form to perpetrate a fraud.67 In Ohio,
courts apply a three-part test different from that in Pennsylvania. The
corporate form may be disregarded "when (1) control over the corporation by
those to be held liable was so complete that the corporation has no separate
mind, will, or existence of its own, (2) control over the corporations by those
to be held liable was exercised in such a manner as to commit fraud or an
illegal act against the person seeking to disregard the corporate entity, and (3)
injury or unjust loss resulted to the plaintiff from such control and wrong.""
Not only are the elements different in the Ohio and Pennsylvania tests, but
their significance varies as well. In particular, the Ohio elements are
requirements whereas the Pennsylvania elements merely are factors. Thus, in
Pennsylvania the use of the corporate form to perpetrate a fraud is not required
to pierce the corporate veil if the other factors weigh in heavily.69 In Ohio,
however, the use of the corporate form to perpetrate a fraud or an illegal act
is a requirement; without it, the corporate form can not be pierced.70
To illustrate the difference between Ohio and Pennsylvania law, consider
the relationship between CPC and Ott II in Bestfoods under Pennsylvania and
Ohio veil piercing tests. The affairs of CPC and Ott 11 were closely intermin-
gled. CPC fully owned Ott H.7" Officers from CPC participated on and at
times had a majority control over Ott I's Board of Directors. 2 There was a
cross-pollination of CPC and Ott II officers who were involved in decision-
making and daily operations. 3 CPC officers actively participated in
environmental matters at the site.74 CPC exerted financial control over Ott H
through the approval of budgets and capital expenditures.75
Certainly, Ohio law would result in the same conclusion that the Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals reached applying Michigan law. 6 Ohio law requires
67 See Lumax Indus., Inc. v. Aultman, 669 A.2d 893, 895 (Pa. 1995); Miller v. Brass Rail Tavern,
702 A.2d 1072, 1074 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997).
a Belvedere Condominium Unit Owners' Ass'n v. R.E. Roark Companies, Inc., 617 N.E.2d 1075,
1086 (Ohio 1993).
69 See Lycoming County Nursing Home Ass'n v. Department of Labor Prevailing Wage Appeal
Bd., 627 A.2d 238, 249 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1993) ("The corporate existence can be disregarded [under
Pennsylvania law] without a specific showing of fraud whenever it is necessary to avoid injustice or when
public policy requires.").
70 See id.





76 See infra Section III (describing veil piercing requirements under Michigan law).
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control exercised in such a manner as to commit fraud or an illegal act.
"While these factors reveal a parent that took an active interest in the affairs
of its subsidiary, none of them indicate that CPC utilized the corporate form
to perpetrate a 'fraud or wrong' as required before a court can pierce the
veil. ,7
Pennsylvania veil piercing law, as described above, allows for consider-
ation of several factors in its test. Under this analysis, there was substantial
intermingling of CPC and Ott H's financial affairs. There was cross-
pollination of officers between the two corporations, and CPC's officers
actively participated in environmental matters at the site. The service of CPC
officers on Ott II's Board could raise questions whether corporate formalities
were adhered to. For the purposes of this hypothetical application of
Pennsylvania law, assume that Ott IH was vastly undercapitalized. 8 Under
Pennsylvania's veil-piercing laws, a strong argument can be made that the
curtain shielding CPC should be pierced. Pennsylvania's caselaw supports this
interpretation.
In Lycoming County Nursing Home Association v. Department of Labor
Prevailing Wage Appeal Board,79 the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania
affirmed a decision of the Department of Labor and Industry's Prevailing
Wage Appeal Board and held that a nonprofit corporation which had
contracted for the construction of a nursing facility was the alter-ego of
Lycoming County and that the corporate veil of the nonprofit corporation
could be pierced.'0 To reach its decision, the court relied exclusively on the
control exerted by three county commissioners over the nonprofit
corporation.8 The commissioners filed the Articles of Incorporation for the
nonprofit corporation and initially served as its Board of Directors.82
Furthermore, the chairperson of the commissioners signed the agreement
authorizing construction of the nursing home by the new corporation.8
The Commissioners, and therefore the County, controlled the project
from its inception.
n' Cordova Chen Co. of Mich., 59 F.3d at 591.
78 Empirically, inadequate capitalization may be the most important factor U.S. courts using
balancing approaches rely on in piercing the veil analyses. See Chuan Roger Peng, limited Liability in
China: A Partial Reading of China's Company Law of 1994, 10 COLUM. J. ASIAN L 263, 273 (1996).
79 627 A.2d 238 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1993).
90 See Lycoming County Nursing Home Ass'n, 627 A.2d at 244.
81 See id.
92 See id. at 240.
93 See id. at 241.
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The attempts to disassociate the County from the Association did
not overcome the fact that the Association was the instrumentality of
the County. We clearly do not wish to convey the idea that the
Commissioners' acts were fraudulent. However, the corporate
existence can be disregarded without a specific showing of fraud
whenever it is necessary to avoid injustice or when public policy
requires. 4
The control element relied upon in Lycoming is also apparent in
Bestfoods. CPC exerted control over both Ott I's financial affairs and over
its Board of Directors. While the Lycoming court perhaps would hold that this
alone is sufficient to pierce CPC's corporate veil, the hypothetical
undercapitalization of Ott II would undeniably strengthen this position.
In summary, the facts of Besfoods applied to Pennsylvania and Ohio law
would potentially result in different legal conclusions. CPC's corporate veil
would probably remain unbroken under Ohio law but it could realistically be
breached under Pennsylvania law.
While it would be impracticable to spell out the nuances of every piercing
test used by every state, similar variations exist across the board. 5 Clearly,
the notion that state common law is uniform in this area is erroneous. This
lack of uniformity is even more unwieldy because different bodies of cases
must be used to interpret each test. Pennsylvania cases must be used to
interpret Pennsylvania's test; Ohio cases must be used to interpret Ohio's test.
9 Id. at 244.
85 See, e.g.,
A plaintiff seeking to pierce the corporate veil must allege and prove that the corporation was
under the actual control of the shareholder and that the shareholder exercised such control to
commit a fraud or other wrong in contravention of the plaintiff's rights .... Some of the relevant
factors in determining whether to disregard the corporate entity on the basis of fraud are: (1)
Grossly inadequate capitalization; (2) Insolvency of the debtor corporation at the time the debt
is incurred; (3) Diversion by the shareholder or shareholders of corporate funds or assets to their
own or other improper uses; and (4) The fact that the corporation is a mere facade for the
personal dealings of the shareholder and that the operations of the corporation are carried on by
the shareholder in disregard of the corporate entity.
Wolf v. Walt, 530 N.W.2d 890, 896 (Neb. 1995);
In general, the two requirements for applying the alter ego doctrine are that (1) there is such a
unity of interest and ownership between the corporation and the individual or organization
controlling it that their separate personalities no longer exist, and (2) failure to disregard the
corporate entity would sanction a fraud or promote injustice.
Communist Party of the United States v. Valencia, Inc., 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d 618, 625 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995).
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VI. ARGUMENT FOR FEDERAL COMMON LAW
"There is always a simple way of saying things."
86
Federal common law principles should apply where: (1) there is "an area
of uniquely federal interest," and (2) "a significant conflict exists between an
identifiable federal policy or interest and the [operation] of state law."87 Both
of these criteria are clearly satisfied in piercing the veil analyses under
CERCLA.
CERCLA is a nationwide program enacted to provide rapid responses to
threats posed by improperly managed hazardous waste sites.8  CERCLA's
legislative history indicates that Congress expected federal courts to adopt
federal common law to supplement the statute.8 9 During the House proceed-
ings to enact the bill, Representative James J. Florio stated, "[t]o insure the
development of a uniform rule of law, and to discourage business dealing in
hazardous substances from locating primarily in states with more lenient laws,
the bill will encourage the further development of a Federal common law in
this area.9'
Where a federal interest requires a uniform rule, the entire body of state
law conflicts and must be replaced with federal law.9' "A [CERCLA] liability
standard which varies in the different forum states would undermine the
policies of the statute by encouraging illegal dumping in states with lax
liability laws." 92 As it stands today, CERCLA is subject to non-uniform
application inconsistent with these principles. For example, under Ohio law,
a corporation can exert a tremendous amount of control over a subsidiary and
still avoid CERCLA liability if fraud or an illegal act is missing.9 Michigan
law is equally protective of the parent, prohibiting the veil to be pierced absent
86 Fritz Leiber, THE THREE OF SWORDS 453 (1973).
97 Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 507 (1988).
99 See United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 805 (S. D. Ohio 1983); see also 5
U.S.Code Cong. & Ad. News 6119,6119-20(1980); David C. Clarke, Successor Liability Under CERCLA:
A Federal Common Law Approach, 58 GEO. WASH. L REv. 1300, 1309 (1990) ("CERCLA is a nationwide
federal program directly implicating important federal rights and interests.").
9 See Smith Land & Improvement Corp. v. Celotex Corp., 851 F.2d 86,91 (3rd Cir. 1988); United
States v. Bliss, 667 F. Supp. 1298, 1308 n.8 (E.D.Mo. 1987); Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. at 808.
90 126 Cong.Rec. HI 1787 (Dec. 3, 1980).
91 See Boyle, 487 U.S. at 508.
92 Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. at 809; see also 126 Cong.Rec. at H11787; Report to
Congress, Injuries and Damages From Hazardous Wastes-Analysis and Improvement of Legal Remedies,
97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982).
93 See infra Section V.
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fraud or wrongdoing.94 However, Pennsylvania law uses a more liberal
balancing approach, which results in a different and perhaps less protective
scheme for the parent corporation."
CERCLA piercing analyses should not be left to the vagaries of state law.
As the previous sections demonstrate, state laws do differ in their guiding
principles for piercing the corporate veil. Moreover, using a particular state's
laws incurs the added burden of using that state's case precedent to interpret
the piercing principles. Because some circuits choose to apply the law of the
place of incorporation, there is also a distinct possibility that this federal
statute could be placed at the whim of a foreign country's laws or lack thereof.
Adoption of a federal common law standard would not cause a dramatic
divergence from state law standards. Federal common law would not be a
wholly alien body of law. While differences do exist among the piercing laws
of various states, federal common law would likely draw upon them all for
guidance."
It is simply not in the best interest of parent corporations and. parties
seeking environmental clean-up costs to be placed at the whim of the
uncertainty and the lack of uniformity in the current framework. Without a
unifying federal common law standard, the parties in CERCLA cases have
been placed in the unenviable position of litigating this choice of law issue in
case after case rather than actually spending their dollars arguing the
substantive requirements of the test itself.
A federal common law standard is not without support. More than one
circuit has adopted the standard in its CERCLA veil piercing analyses 97 and
several commentators have expressed support for a federal standard.9 The
primary article cited in support of the status quo is an article by Richard G.
Dennis.99 Dennis argues that the case for uniformity may not be as strong as
it first appears because there is no "readily apparent" congressional intent in
favor of uniformity and CERCLA does not need uniformity to execute the
federal mandate."0 Representative Florio's comments and the fact that several
94 See infra Section I.
'7 See infra Section V.
97 See Acushnet River, 675 F. Supp. at 33.
97 See infra Section TV.
99 See, e.g., Lansford-Coaldale, 4 F.3d 1209, 1225 (arguing that there is a federal interest in the
uniform application of CERCLA); Evelyn F. Heidelberg, Comment, Parent Corporation Liability Under
CERCLA: Toward a Uniform Federal Rule of Decision, 22 PAC.LJ. 854 (1991).
' Liability of Officers, Directors and Stockholders Under CERCLA: The Casefor Adopting State
Law, 36 Vu.u. L REV. 1367, 1445, 1455, 1459 (1991). This article was among those cited by the Bestfoods
Court to demonstrate scholarly disagreement on this issue. See Bestfoods. 118 S.Ct. at 1885 n.9.
"7 See Dennis, supra, note 99, at 1445, 1455, 1459.
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circuits have decided to apply federal common law clearly evidence a
congressional intent and a recognized need for uniformity.
Dennis supports his argument by stating that "the federal government does
not have an overriding need under CERCLA to make quick and uniform
responses.""'  What then is the point in even having CERCLA? If the
Bestfoods facts do not warrant a quick and uniform federal response, one can
hardly imagine a scenario under a federal statute requiring one. "[T]he land
[around the chemical facility was] littered with thousands of leaking and even
exploding drums of waste, and the soil and water [was] saturated with noxious
chemicals."'" The groundwater "contained foam and a brownish color like
root beer."'0 3 As one court has stated, " CERCLA presents a national solution
to a nationwide problem. One can hardly imagine a federal program more
demanding of national uniformity than environmental protection."'"'°
As an additional factor supporting his argument, Dennis cited the lack of
uniformity even in federal common law piercing tests and the impracticability
of this issue reaching the Supreme Court based on its caseload."0 5
Cases that have addressed the potential development of a federal
common law in other contexts have come to different conclusions,
based on principles that can be applied to the area of CERCLA
liability.
Generally speaking, the impracticality of a uniform federal
common law results from the improbability of general agreement
among the twelve circuit courts. The United States Supreme Court is
the only forum that can create true uniformity, and such uniformity is
unlikely to be forthcoming given the present caseload of the Supreme
Court.10
6
While the variation Dennis refers to is evident in differences between the
Third Circuit federal common law piercing test and the First and Second
Circuit federal common law piercing tests described in Section IV above, the
First and Second Circuits apply the same factors to their tests. Nevertheless,
the potential for variation in federal common law evidences a need for a
federal common law standard developed by the United States Supreme Court.
A heavy caseload of the Court is a weak foundation for Dennis' assertion that
101 Dennis, supra note 99, at 1458.
Ica Bestfoods, 118 S.Ct. at 1882.
103 CPC Int'l, Inc., 777 F. Supp. at 562-63.
104 Acushnet River, 675 F. Supp. at 31.
105 See Dennis, supra note 99, at 1463.
106 Id. at 1463.
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the status quo is appropriate. Our entire legal system is overburdened with
cases. A heavy caseload could be raised as an argument in every legal debate
in every court. Under this rationale, law is unable to evolve merely based on
a crowded docket. Dennis made his prediction in 1991," ° but Bestfoods
demonstrates that the Court has in fact addressed liability under CERCLA.
While the Court was unable to address choice of law principles for CERCLA
veil piercing because no party raised this issue, the Court seemingly did set the
stage to conclude this matter in a future case."'
VI. CONCLUSION
Parent companies use CERCLA interpretations for guidance in order to
assess what kind of activities could result in liability.' 9 While Bestfoods left
many questions unanswered, it answered others. For example, the decision
makes clear that direct CERCLA liability will not attach to a corporate parent
whose oversight actions are consistent with its role as an interested investor." 0
Bestfoods did not, however, clear up the controversy surrounding indirect
liability under CERCLA. Whether state or federal common law applies to veil
piercing is still a litigious subject. More appropriately, the debate is which
state's law applies or whether federal common law applies. Unfortunately,
until the Supreme Court has an opportunity to address this issue directly,
courts and corporations will be left with the specter of uncertainty.
"ov See id.
108 See infra Section IlL
109 See Seilheimer, supra note 18.
Ito See Bestfoods, 118 S.Ct. at 1889.
